Accomplices, including corrupt government officials and complicit freight agents, were placed at strategic points throughout the trade chain, which enabled the syndicate to “own the route.” Direct transport from Africa to China was considered too great a risk, so the group chose multiple transit ports such as Mombasa (Kenya), Singapore, Busan (South Korea), and Hai Phong (Vietnam).
![cyndicate trafficker cyndicate trafficker](https://dailymirror.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/iStock-1208497333-e1620881833835-800x445.jpg)
The syndicate chose their route carefully to evade detection by enforcement authorities. However, such inspections were conducted under tightly controlled conditions. One exception being when traffickers decide to inspect tusks prior to shipping, checking on the quality of the product they were buying. The Shuidong syndicate operated with caution, minimizing physical contact with the ivory, and instead employing locals in Africa to collect and store the tusks. The nature of a consignee’s business is also an important factor as this appears on the shipping documents.Īvoiding possession. The goods used by the Shuidong syndicate to conceal ivory included plastic pellets, sea shells, peanuts, and tea leaves.
![cyndicate trafficker cyndicate trafficker](http://www.voxspace.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Human-Trafficking-1067x600.jpg)
According to Xie Xingbang, the choice of “filler” or legitimate goods to conceal the ivory is critical to avoid arousing suspicion at the point of export or import. The syndicate used a variety of legitimate products to conceal several tonnes of ivory in containers. Indeed, syndicate members admitted that corrupt officials would themselves weigh the goods, and charge the bribe, according to the weight of the ivory being shipped.Ĭoncealment methods.
![cyndicate trafficker cyndicate trafficker](https://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2017/05/27/09/40D84B5E00000578-4547204-image-a-1_1495872298514.jpg)
The syndicate’s operations were heavily dependent on establishing relationships with local “confidantes” and corrupt officials, for example, through the payment of bribes to Customs officers and port officials to ensure safe shipping and non-inspection of goods. The Shuidong syndicate demonstrated several organized crime characteristics: significant financial investment sophistication of smuggling techniques and routes facilitation of multiple shipments reliance on corruption money laundering and trade in multiple species such as ivory, pangolins, rhino horn, and fish maws. By following leads from previous investigations in Tanzania on Shuidongese sea cucumber traders, in 2016, the EIA encountered three major ivory traffickers in Mozambique – Ou Haiqiang, Xie Xingbang and Wang Kangwen, all of whom have been apprehended by China Customs in the last two years. Traders from Shuidong originally involved in the sea cucumber and fish maw business had diversified into the profitable illicit trade in ivory and other wildlife, such as rhino horn and pangolin scales. Sea cucumbers are threatened by over-fishing to meet the rising demand for this highly-prized food delicacy © Environmental Investigation Agency
![cyndicate trafficker cyndicate trafficker](https://www.theborneopost.com/newsimages/2019/12/customs-drug................gif)
At an early stage, it became clear that there was a close connection between the trade in marine products and ivory trafficking. In-depth research and investigations by the EIA between 20 provided unique insights into the role of a major Chinese criminal syndicate involved in the trafficking of elephant ivory from East Africa to Shuidong, located in southern China’s Guangdong Province.